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E-invoice phishing: when even Microsoft is mistaken for a scam

Justin De Jager
November 15, 2026
14 min read
Actualiteiten en Achtergrond, Praktische Gidsen

On 12 November 2026, German trade media reported that finance departments had mistaken genuine invoices from Microsoft Germany for e-invoice phishing. The amounts were correct and the PDFs were accurate. The suspicion came down to one detail: the messages did not come from a Microsoft domain but from pageroonline.com, the domain of the service provider that sends the invoices on Microsoft’s behalf (Unternehmensportal.com; ad-hoc-news).

The risk therefore lay in the channel the invoice arrived through, not in the invoice itself. Email has no verified business sender. Peppol does: senders and receivers are identified by their Peppol ID, their registration in an SMP and certified access points operated by Peppol Service Providers. This article explains that mechanism, shows through which channel e-invoices arrive in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Germany, and ends with a checklist that helps accounts payable recognise a genuine e-invoice.

What happened at Microsoft Germany

In November 2026, Microsoft Germany started sending invoices to business customers electronically. It is doing so ahead of the German issuing obligation and partly as a test. The invoices are sent through Pagero, an e-invoicing service provider that has been part of Thomson Reuters since 2024. Customers without a registered Peppol endpoint receive the invoice by email, from an address at @pageroonline.com (ad-hoc-news). The reports do not state which invoice format Microsoft uses.

Microsoft had informed customers by email in early October 2026 and published a page of frequently asked questions. That notice did not reach every department involved. IT and accounting teams saw an invoice from a well-known brand arrive from an unknown domain, a pattern that closely resembles common phishing attacks, and raised the alarm. Unternehmensportal.com points out that an unfamiliar domain alone is no proof of fraud, but it is a reason to check.

Using a specialised service provider is standard practice. Large senders often outsource e-invoice delivery because such a provider manages connections to multiple networks and countries. Whether the recipient is reassured or alarmed depends on the channel.

Why email has no verified sender

Email is a transport channel. Techniques such as SPF, DKIM and DMARC can show that a message really comes from a given domain, but not that the domain belongs to your supplier. A recipient who does not know pageroonline.com cannot tell from the email alone that Pagero is sending on Microsoft’s behalf. Conversely, a trusted domain proves little if a supplier’s mailbox has been compromised.

The invoice file does not provide that certainty either. Validation against the European standard EN 16931 shows that an e-invoice is formally correct. Common e-invoice files are not digitally signed, so a fraudster can also produce a formally valid invoice with their own IBAN (ZUGFeRDpro). Validation is necessary, but it is not proof of authenticity.

On top of that, spam filters often block or flag messages with attachments from unknown domains. A legitimate switchover can end up in quarantine, while a well-crafted phishing email is delivered.

How Peppol identifies sender and receiver

Peppol works with registered participants instead of email addresses. The Peppol architecture has four roles: the sender, the sender’s access point, the receiver’s access point and the receiver. The access points are operated by Peppol Service Providers that have signed an agreement with a Peppol Authority and are certified to operate on the network. Four building blocks make sure the sender is known:

  • Peppol ID. Every participant has a unique address based on an existing identification number, such as a chamber of commerce number, enterprise number, VAT number or OIN, preceded by a code for the type of number.
  • SML and SMP. The sender’s access point looks up the receiver’s Peppol ID through the central Service Metadata Locator (SML). It points to the receiver’s Service Metadata Publisher (SMP), which states the access point through which the receiver can be reached and which document types it accepts.
  • Peppol Directory. In the public Peppol Directory you can look up which organisation a Peppol ID belongs to. Publication in the Directory is done by the SMP operator and is optional, so not every registered participant is visible there (Peppol Directory specification).
  • Secured transport. Access points exchange messages using certificates issued within Peppol. A message therefore demonstrably comes from a connected access point and has not been altered in transit.

For the receiver, this means an invoice arriving via Peppol comes from a participant with a known Peppol ID, sent through an access point bound by the network’s agreements. The service provider’s domain plays no role: whether a supplier sends directly or uses a service provider, the invoice arrives under the supplier’s Peppol ID.

Peppol does not eliminate every form of fraud. If a supplier’s own system is misused, a changed bank account number remains a risk. The most common attack pattern, a forged invoice sent from an arbitrary email address, has no way in on Peppol.

Fallback channels: what happens without a registered Peppol ID

A sender invoicing via Peppol checks for each invoice whether the receiver is registered in an SMP. If so, the invoice goes via Peppol. If not, many service providers switch to a fallback channel: an e-invoice by email with a PDF and an XML file, a download link or a portal. That is what Microsoft Germany did for customers without a registered Peppol endpoint.

The fallback channel is designed to reach every recipient, and it does. The recipient then receives the invoice through the very channel in which phishing thrives, often from the domain of a service provider they do not know. Organisations that register their Peppol ID receive e-invoices from Peppol-enabled senders directly in their own systems, without a mailbox in between.

Which channel per country: the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Germany

Whether an e-invoice arrives via Peppol, an approved platform or email depends on the rules in the buyer’s country. For every company that invoices, or receives invoices from, businesses in these countries, the following frameworks apply.

CountryObligationChannel
NetherlandsSuppliers to central government must send an e-invoice; a PDF is not an e-invoice (Ondernemersplein). On 11 September 2026 the Dutch cabinet opted for mandatory B2B e-invoicing from 1 July 2030; the bill is expected to be submitted before summer 2027 (Rijksoverheid).To central government via Peppol among other routes, alongside invoice portals and the supplier portal. The network for the B2B obligation has not yet been decided.
BelgiumSince 1 January 2026, the structured e-invoice is the only legally required invoice between VAT-registered businesses (FPS Finance).In principle via Peppol; another electronic channel only if the customer agrees. Publication in the Peppol Directory counts as agreement to receive structured e-invoices.
LuxembourgSince 18 March 2023, all suppliers under a public procurement or concession contract must send e-invoices (Guichet.lu).Via Peppol or MyGuichet.lu; other channels, such as email, are not permitted.
FranceSince 1 September 2026, every business must be able to receive e-invoices. Large and mid-sized companies (ETI) have issued electronically since that date; SMEs and micro-enterprises must do so by 1 September 2027 at the latest (impots.gouv.fr).Mandatory via a Plateforme Agréée. The chosen platforms are recorded in the directory (annuaire) managed by the tax administration (impots.gouv.fr).
GermanySince 1 January 2025, every business must be able to receive an E-Rechnung (BMF). The issuing obligation applies from 1 January 2027 to businesses with prior-year turnover above EUR 800,000 and from 1 January 2028 to all businesses (§ 27(38) UStG). Small-amount invoices up to EUR 250 may always be issued in another form (§ 33 UStDV).No mandatory network. Email, Peppol and EDI are used side by side, so e-invoices often arrive by email.

This overview shows a clear difference. In Belgium, Luxembourg and France, mandatory exchange runs through registered participants or approved platforms with a central directory. In Germany, and in the Netherlands until the B2B obligation takes effect, email is still a fully accepted channel. That is where a genuine e-invoice is most likely to arrive from a sender the recipient does not know. Read more about the German rules in our article on the BMF letter on e-invoicing in Germany and in the overview of e-invoicing mandates in 2027.

Practical guide: how to recognise and prevent e-invoice phishing

This checklist is intended for finance managers and accounts payable teams in every company that receives e-invoices, regardless of the country it operates in.

Checking an incoming e-invoice

  1. No login, no codes. A genuine e-invoice is a file: an XML file or a PDF with embedded XML. Fallback channels sometimes use a download link, but never enter credentials or verification codes on a page reached through an invoice email.
  2. Validate the file. Have the XML checked against EN 16931 and the applicable specification, such as Peppol BIS Billing or XRechnung. A failed validation or a missing XML file is a warning; a passed validation only proves the file is formally correct.
  3. Check VAT number and IBAN against your master data. Compare the data in the XML, not just the PDF rendering. If the PDF and XML differ, the invoice is faulty or manipulated.
  4. Treat a new IBAN as a red flag. Always verify a changed bank account number before payment, especially when combined with a new sender address or time pressure. Have payments to a new account approved by a second person.
  5. Call a known number. When in doubt, contact the supplier using the phone number or contact person in your own records, never the details in the suspicious email.
  6. Look up the announcement. Suppliers usually announce a switch to a new format or sender address in advance. Compare the invoice with that announcement and with any FAQ the supplier has published.
  7. Check spam and quarantine folders once a supplier has announced a switchover, so a genuine invoice is not left unseen.

Receiving fewer e-invoices by email

  1. Register your Peppol ID. Have your organisation registered in an SMP through a Peppol Service Provider for the document types you want to receive, at least invoices and credit notes.
  2. Check the Peppol Directory. Look up your organisation in the Peppol Directory and check name, country and identifier. If you are missing or an outdated registration is listed, contact your Peppol Service Provider.
  3. Ask suppliers to send via Peppol. State your Peppol ID in purchasing terms, on purchase orders and in supplier portals, and explicitly ask regular suppliers to invoice via Peppol.
  4. Make sure announcements reach every department. Set up one functional address for notices about invoice delivery and share incoming announcements with accounts payable, purchasing, IT and security. Record announced sender domains so the security team can assess them.
  5. Agree a reporting route with IT. Agree how suspicious invoice emails are reported and assessed, so a genuine invoice is not deleted and a fake one is not paid.

For software vendors

Software vendors that send e-invoices on behalf of customers prevent false alarms with a complete announcement: the start date, the format (for example Peppol BIS Billing, XRechnung or a hybrid PDF), the channel (Peppol or email) and the exact sender address or domain. Have customers send that announcement to both the contact address and the invoice-receiving address of their buyers, and publish it on a findable page on the sender’s own domain. Show in the software before sending whether the buyer has a Peppol ID, so falling back to email is a deliberate choice.

For Peppol service providers

An email fallback is a service to the sender, but the recipient usually does not know the service provider’s domain. Make fallback emails clearly name the sending company, point to a way of verifying on that company’s own domain and use every fallback email to encourage the recipient to register a Peppol ID. Keep customers’ SMP registrations and Directory entries up to date, so senders find them via Peppol and do not fall back to email unnecessarily.

Frequently asked questions

Is an e-invoice from an unknown sender domain always phishing?

No. Large senders often use a service provider that sends from its own domain. An unknown domain is a reason to check: compare the invoice with the supplier’s announcement, validate the file and check the VAT number and IBAN against your master data.

How do I check whether my organisation has a Peppol ID?

Search the Peppol Directory by name or identifier, or ask your Peppol Service Provider to confirm the SMP registration. Publication in the Directory is optional, so the service provider gives the definitive answer.

Will I stop receiving e-invoices by email once my Peppol ID is registered?

Invoices from senders that use Peppol will then arrive via Peppol. Senders that do not use Peppol can still invoice you by email, particularly in countries without a mandatory network, such as Germany.

Is an e-invoice sent via Peppol fraud-proof?

Peppol identifies the sending participant and secures transport between access points. Checking bank account numbers remains necessary, because a genuine sender can also pass on an incorrect or manipulated IBAN.

Sources

  1. Unternehmensportal.com, “Microsoft verschickt E-Rechnungen über Pagero und löst Phishing-Verdacht aus”, 12 November 2026
  2. ad-hoc-news.de, “E-Rechnung bei Microsoft: Fremde Absenderadresse löst Phishing-Alarm aus”, 12 November 2026
  3. ZUGFeRDpro, “E-Rechnung von neuem Absender: echt oder Phishing?” (general verification tips)
  4. German Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF), FAQ on the introduction of mandatory e-invoicing from 1 January 2025
  5. German VAT Act (UStG), § 27(38) (e-invoice transition rules)
  6. German VAT Implementing Regulation (UStDV), § 33 (small-amount invoices)
  7. FPS Finance, einvoice.belgium.be: General questions on the B2B obligation
  8. impots.gouv.fr, Foire aux questions: je découvre la facturation électronique
  9. impots.gouv.fr, Facturation électronique et plateformes agréées
  10. Guichet.lu, Transmission of a compliant electronic invoice under a public procurement or concession contract
  11. Ondernemersplein (Dutch government business portal), E-factureren aan de overheid
  12. Rijksoverheid, “Kabinet kiest voor invoering e-facturatie en rapportage voor bedrijven”, 11 September 2026
  13. OpenPeppol, Peppol Directory specification 1.1
  14. Peppol Directory, How to use Peppol Directory

Reducing e-invoice phishing for good starts with a registered Peppol ID. In the Peppol.now comparison tool you can compare Peppol Service Providers and solutions for receiving e-invoices via Peppol.

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